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What is consciousness? Where is it located? 
How can we be aware of another creature being 
conscious? How come Why is this awareness both 
so rich and so ineffable? These are only a few of the 
many questions related to the problem of con-
sciousness which philosophy and the sciences have 
tried to answer over the centuries.  
Jesse Prinz now maintains that the only way to 
approach such questions correctly is to narrow 
them down to one core issue: What is the brain 
source of consciousness in human beings? Starting 
from the very first pages of his Preface, Prinz ex-
plicitly commits himself to a reductionist position 
within the mind/brain debate.  
The title itself is a straightforward reply to Da-
vid Chalmer's defense of “dualism” in The Con-
scious Mind (1996), and many other well-known 
works by this author. The main aim of The Con-
scious Brain is instead to search for a scientifically 
informed reduction of consciousness.  
As is obvious, the task is huge. Indeed, the first 
step towards this goal is a substantive review of the 
main theoretical perspectives and positions regarding 
consciousness up to the present time, divided by Prinz 
into “philosophical” and “scientific” theories. This 
overview serves the specific function of eliciting the 
characteristics of a good theory of consciousness.  
By criticizing the problematic aspects of each 
position under examination, Prinz emphasizes a 
series of desiderata that a proper, and exhaustive, 
theory of consciousness must match. Examples of 
such desiderata include the “subjective character” 
of consciousness, which implies that every qualita-
tive state has the character of conscious appear-
ance, and the “multilevel integration” of the theory, 
meaning that a good theory should integrate differ-
ent levels of description and thus, ultimately, iden-
tify the neural correlates of consciousness.  
Prinz's real starting point is the so-called inter-
mediate level hypothesis, first presented by Ray 
Jackendoff in his Consciousness and the computa-
tional mind (1987). The gist of the proposal, which 
considers the brain as a biological computational 
device, is the identification of the locus of con-
sciousness within the computational stream. The 
basic intuition here is that the computational flow 
can be divided into at least three levels of pro-
cessing, based on the type of information specific to 
each level. The only level presenting features com-
patible with those of conscious experience is the 
intermediate one.  
Prinz tests the consistency of the intermediate 
level hypothesis with recent experiments and data 
coming from the neurosciences reaching the con-
clusion that not only is the hypothesis consistent 
with the examined data, it becomes even more 
plausible when the most recent scientific findings 
are taken into account. 
Having established the plausibility of the as-
sumption of consciousness “being given” at the in-
termediate level, Prinz integrates this with his own 
theory that he calls the “AIR” theory of conscious-
ness. This theory is based on current research on 
attentional modulation processes. “AIR” means At-
tended Intermediate-level Representations. The 
name introduces the core element of the Author's 
theory: attention. The main strategy of the theory 
is to systematically show how representations of a 
given stimulus located at an intermediate level of 
processing, become conscious through attention.  
Prinz tries hard to remain coherent with his re-
ductionist commitment throughout the whole book, 
therefore his subsequent effort is to identify the neu-
ral correlates of intermediate level representations 
and attention. On the whole, he achieves this goal.  
His overview of the available neurological data 
is thorough, and he seems to find a pattern in this 
data that is consistent with his perspective. There-
fore the theory he proposes is, though very general, 
at least to some degree a truly representational and 
computational one. And it has the advantage of ex-
amining, and trying to explain, how consciousness 
arises in the brain from a psychological perspective 
and from a neuro-biologically grounded one at the 
same time. 
Prinz's further aim, however, is to address much 
more philosophical problems from the particular 
perspective of the AIR theory in order to put its 
explanatory effectiveness to the test. In particular, 
he tries to explore the defining limits of conscious-
ness. First of all, he argues that all consciousness is 
perceptual, thus subscribing to a “restrictivist” posi-
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tion. Restrictivists typically claim that there is noth-
ing within phenomenology that has its origins out-
side sensory experience.  
This does not imply that such things as emo-
tions, thoughts or intuition do not contribute to 
phenomenal consciousness, but rather that, what-
ever their role and status in conscious experience, it 
can be understood and analyzed in terms of sensori-
ly derived elements. In this perspective, a conscious 
emotion really becomes a complex collection, or 
construction, of sensory inner “states”, such as in-
creased heartbeat, sweat and so on, linked to specif-
ic, sensory outer “causes”. Conscious thoughts are, 
on the other hand, explainable in terms of verbal 
imagery and “inner speech” (p.159), and so on.  
This is clearly a critical aspect of Prinz's extend-
ed argument. A second point concerns the relation 
between consciousness and action. Prinz begins 
with a criticism of “enactivist” theories, which 
claim that consciousness originates from sensory 
motor inputs related to possible actions. According 
to enactivists, consciousness is determined and 
caused by actions. Prinz follows a milder perspec-
tive, arguing that there is a strict relationship be-
tween consciousness and action, but it is con-
sciousness that bears the responsibility for guiding 
and controlling a person's behaviour.  
The third critical point is perhaps the most con-
troversial, at least philosophically. It regards the 
nature and actual existence of the phenomenal 
“Self”. Prinz argues that there is no such thing as a 
phenomenal experience of the Self. We do not ex-
perience (phenomenally) a unified subject who is 
conscious and in which we identify our own Self.  
Phenomenal experience consists of a collection 
of phenomenal states, none of which need to be 
further considered as being experienced by some-
one. There is a sense, though, in which the Self is 
present in experience and that is, in Prinz's own 
words, «by virtue of its absence» (p. 240). As Prinz 
importantly concedes, a fundamental characteristic 
of phenomenal states, and the intermediate-level 
representations on which they are based, is that 
they are essentially viewer-centered.  
Consciousness is the consciousness of an organ-
ism that must take a conscious organism-centered 
point of view, in order to interact with the environ-
ment and control its actions. This does not entail 
that the organism needs to have an actual phenom-
enal experience of being a subject, even less a sub-
ject conceived as separate or independent. Thus, 
the phenomenal Self merely assumes the character 
of a useful illusion, inferred from a series of viewer-
centered (or better experiencer-centered, since one 
or more sensory modalities are always involved) 
phenomenal states. The Self is present in experi-
ence only in this “negative” sense.  
There are, undoubtedly, still several unresolved 
aspects of this general picture. But the purpose of 
this review is, at most, to uncover the (often subtle) 
points proposed, rather than to solve the related 
problems. We also have to consider that Prinz does 
not mean to cast doubt on the existence of the sub-
ject in the sense, for instance, in which it is accepted 
in ordinary language and intuitions.  
He rather tries to show that, even if the Self ex-
ists, we have no conscious experience of it, so to 
speak, per se. A conscious organism should not pos-
tulate a conscious experience of its subjectivity 
from a series of subjective conscious states, nor 
should we. It is incorrect to synthesize the unitary 
experience of these states under (the heading of) a 
consciously experienced subject. Rather, a series of 
subjective conscious states suggests that a subject 
exists, although it is never consciously experienced. 
In the third part of his work, Prinz deals with 
what he calls the “metaphysical puzzles of con-
sciousness”, which are essentially its “unity” and its 
“physical nature”. Addressing some of the classical 
problems in this old, and new, debate, such as the 
origin of unified conscious states from fragmented 
input, and the “knowledge argument”, the Author 
examines the possibility of defending a physicalist 
perspective.  
Concerning the unity problem, one advantage 
of the Author’s approach is that he solves, or be-
lieves he has solved, the puzzle without introducing 
or postulating any elements beyond those already 
mentioned: attention and intermediate-level repre-
sentations. Attention has the role of modulating the 
activity of a population of neurons (corresponding 
to an intermediate level representation) on a specif-
ic frequency (Gamma).  
When a population of neurons shows a recurrent 
pattern of activation (called a Vectorwave) in the 
presence of a stimulus, this can be interpreted as evi-
dence that this population represents a particular 
micro-feature of the stimulus. If this particular pat-
tern occurs at a determinate frequency (identified 
with the Gamma frequency) this means, in fact, that 
the representation is modulated by attention.  
When this happens, the representation be-
comes available for encoding (although it is not yet 
encoded) in working memory, which is where im-
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mediate decision making and further information 
processing takes place. If different populations of 
neurons, corresponding to different representa-
tions, are modulated by attention at the same fre-
quency range, they enter into a state of resonance. 
Therefore, in Prinz's perspective, the unity of con-
sciousness is considered as deriving from atten-
tional resonance.  
The relationship between the psychological 
characterization of conscious states as Attended In-
termediate-Level Representations, and their neural 
correlates is also investigated with promising results. 
In fact, one of the core problems in the debate about 
mind/brain states results from the fact that a physi-
calist is committed to ascribing causal capability ex-
clusively to the physical level, leaving aside the psy-
chological level as ultimately irrelevant.  
To avoid this epiphenomenalist consequence, 
Prinz advances a new position, which he calls Neu-
rofunctionalism: «A mental state is neurofunctional 
if […] its being the state that it is depends on its 
psychological role and its neural implementation 
[…] these levels are not only jointly required, but 
also interdependent. Function depends on realizers 
and conversely» (p. 286).  
Conscious mental states are then neurofunc-
tional states, which means that they are identified 
equally as their brain correlates and by virtue of 
their functional role in consciousness. The experi-
ence of a color is at the same time a particular pat-
tern of activity in one or more populations of neu-
rons and a representation of an environmental fea-
ture, associated in the brain with behavioral reac-
tions, emotional response and other features, all of 
which constitute the scope and the subjective func-
tion, or aim, of consciousness. 
The last and most difficult metaphysical puzzle 
addressed in the book concerns phenomenal 
knowledge. The notorious problem is that, when 
we have a particular phenomenal experience, we 
possibly acquire a kind of knowledge related to the 
experience we are having: we learn “what it is like” 
to have that experience.  
This particular knowledge, if it is knowledge, is 
indeed, for the involved subject, not derivable from 
the sum of the possible physical information that the 
subject can obtain; thus, there appears to be some-
thing, regarding phenomenal states, which is not 
physical. But Prinz claims that the argument is mis-
leading, insofar as there is nothing mysterious, and 
moreover nothing not physical, in the enhancement 
of actual knowledge that being in a particular phe-
nomenal state provides to the subject itself.  
Phenomenal knowledge is, in this perspective, 
obtainable through further inner information pro-
cessing. When a phenomenal state becomes con-
scious, this means that it has been selected by atten-
tion to be possibly encoded in working memory, 
but it is not immediately encoded. When, at a fol-
lowing stage, it is encoded (and maintained) in 
working memory, it becomes available for further 
processing, and a new form of knowledge can be 
extrapolated from this condition.  
This explains why a subject needs to be in a 
state in order to know what its like to be in that 
state, without appealing to anything beyond the 
physical world. 
In the conclusion to his book, Prinz closes the cir-
cle by showing how the AIR theory he has been pro-
posing can match every single desideratum identified 
in the first chapter. And the complex of his work does 
leave an impression of thorough, wide-angled analyses 
of most of the different positions available.  
Starting from a sustained criticism of the vari-
ous problematic aspects of previous theories and 
research, Prinz formulates an essential, consistent 
and straightforward theory of consciousness. More 
than that, he argues for his position both at a psy-
chological level of description and from a neuro-
biologically consistent perspective.  
Many of the topics in the book, as well as the 
analyses of the relevant data and experiments, are 
highly technical and complex, but the Author’s flu-
ent style, along with the many examples he provides, 
“facilitate” an understanding and appreciation of his 
work. Some of the positions proposed by this book 
may appear somehow radical, but they have the mer-
it of always remaining coherent with both the theo-
retical background and the available data, and are 
also tightly, as well as compellingly, argued. 
Francesco Marchi 
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Over the last few decades, the philosophy of 
mind has faced many challenging questions about its 
own methodology: in particular, the so-called prob-
lem of naturalization has given rise to a complex de-
bate on the role of philosophy in elaborating, among 
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